Darrell Nielsen v. Board of Review of The Industrial Commission of Utah, And Department of Employment Security, And Edward R. Beale : Defendant\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983
Darrell Nielsen v. Board of Review of The Industrial
Commission of Utah, And Department of
Employment Security, And Edward R. Beale :
Defendant's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Linda Wheat Gowaty; Attorney for Defendant
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Nielsen v. Board of Review, No. 19369 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4232
IN THE Slll'f:FME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DARPFLL NJ f,LSEN 
Plaintiff, 
\', 
"' ,q;, C'F ::cl' J ['"' OF rnE INDUSTRIAL 
( 11','.,'ll c5 I ON OF \ITAH, cmd DEPARTMENT 
uF HJPUlY'.,IENT SECllkITY, and 
E:J,,,,c;zu k, PEALE, 
Defendants. 
CASE ii 83-A-1331 
SUPREME COURT No. 19369 
BRIEF 
,'rr·:·&l fr,cim the decision of The Industrial Commission of Utah, 
D, p.:. I: i11,·nt of ErnpJ o:·mt~nt Security and Board of Review. 
-·-------------
[·a,·icj L. h'i 1kin~on 
P.tt \' ,':..,·n'=ral of lltah 
StatE- Cci~ 1 irol Building 
Salt Lake City, litah 84114 
by 
Flnvd C:, Astin 
K ~ 1 1 dn Z ab e 1 
~ r 'Ci ;! 1 •, '.' '- i ct ant 
,gell Nie (~. Box 1623 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
/.;;~. lll n1·y C>::'neral 
,,i 1 ·_.tr-; a1 ('(Jf.lTlli ssion of Utah 
•t of Frr1plo~m~nt SPcurity FIL 
11 '.; • ;.] H;:il 1 /'i,\'E-nue 
cc,11 ";" l1ty, lltah 84147 Nov i .1 iJSJ 
D 
CASE* 83-A-1331 
SllPREME COURT No. 19 369 
I•'. 11f TllE INDl1STRIAL 
1 ,1 1 ,\il, :md ]Jf:P.A.kTMENT 
'<I TY, :rncl 
f1 ,111 thF", rl!·cision of The Inclustrial Commission of Utah, 
,1·1 tJ'.nient SPC\Jri ty and Roard of Reviev.'. 
\\ I j ~ 
r .,1 ; .ih 
l: ,, I I I I j ( i 11~ 
, I\ . I t .it. R4 l l4 
~ i in of l't ah 
11 t S··c 1.1 r i l y 
j 1' I ~' 
ts 
£,,\ j ,I ff , 
T• oI~.j~n"-, --h'""'-~""-.'"""""' 
P. 0. Box 1623 
Ogcien, Utah 84402 
111d r,· 1 i ,, f ·" 1\Jf'.ht. 
\'ol11ir1n 5CJ Page 928 Pa.rato:raph 4 .t\rnerican Jurisprudence 2d 
1 1r1itions of Partnership - Under Uniform Partnership Act. 
TIP i:ni form PartnE>rship Act defines a partnership as 11 an 
,r 1,111 of tl,.,'O or more pt->rsons to carry on as co-owners a 
"" fur 11rl1f it.,, 
nee· ,1,umn 33 Page 339 Paragraph 1502 American Jurisprudence 2d 
',.f i11iti( 1n of Partnership - Under Federal Definition. 
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BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH and DEPARTMENT 
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY. and 
EDWARD R BEALE. 
Defendants 
Case No 19369 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
NA TlJKI:. OF CA'.>I:. 
1111· .ir1 Jµpt·dl µursuant to ~J~-11-lU(i I, Utah Code Annotated l'!~J. 
•I•·• 1 ·"'" ut L111· llo<1rd ut l<eview, Industrial Lrnn111i ssion ot Utah, 
""'J t111.· deusion of the Administrative Law Judge declaring that the 
111 "dllt, r.dwJnJ k. beale, was an employee of Darrell Nielsen, the Plain-
1 tr µursuctnt to S;35-4-2i(J), Utah Code Annotated 1953, rather than an 
-1-
DISPO~ITlUN bELOW 
On November 5, 1982 the claimant, Mr. Beale, was notified by the Uepart-
ment of Employment Security that he was monetarily ineligible to recei1c 
unemployment benefits as a result of his association with F.B. Truck Lines 
Mr. Beale filed an appeal against this decision on February 15, 1983 stat 1 r,: 
that he was employed by the Plaintiff, not F.B. Truck Lines, during his bas, 
period. In an appeal decision issued on May 3, 1983 the Appeal Referee rule: 
that Mr. Beale was an employee of the Plaintiff pursuant to §§35-4-ZZIJllS:, 
3~-4-22(p) and 35-4-4(f) of tile Act and remanded the matter to the Centra 
Office for a monetary determination based on this finding. (A timelineo; 
issue with regard to the late-filed appeal was resolved in the claimant'; 
favor based upon continued contact with the Department Representative Jr· 
California.) The Board of Review affirmed the decision of the Appeal Referee 
on July 15, 1983 in Case No. 83-A-1331, 83-BR-33U. 
RELIEF SOUGHT UN APPlAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decisions of the Board of Review and thE 
Appeal keferee. Defendant seeks affinnation of said decisions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was the owner of a semi-tractor for which he contracted wit" 
F.B. Truck Lines to haul various loads, apparently in their trailer1, t· 
whatever location they might specify. RUU41 and 0048 Plaintiff also hire' 
-2-
"' Lf.ct111 consisting of the claimant and another party, who actually 
'·'" cruck. RUUJu and UUJl The claimant and the other driver began 
""Y h.1 the Plaintiff on or about June 29, 1981 and last worked on Octo-
ter 4, HG<'.. Ruul? 
f .b. Truck Lrnes paid the Plaintiff at a rate of ~.65 per loaded mile 
1 11u ~!. or ~.'>J per mile when traveling without a load between hauls. 
J0% ;nE clain1ant received $.lb per mile in 1%1 and $.2U per mile in 
.. •c. rur n1 s sen ices as driver. RUUD The claimant was paid some amounts 
,, jdva11ces and draws d1 rectly by F .B. Truck Lines; however the net earnings 
cuE tr.c c l11mant were paid from the Plaintiff's account. R0043 There were 
n•J µrefits 111ade by tne Plaintiff on the trucking venture. RUU44 The truck 
wis purchased as a tax write-off. RUU51 
mly t11c Pla1nti ff, not F .B. Truck Lines, had the discretion to tennin-
Jte \lie cla1111dnt's services. ROU44 and 0047 The Plaintiff had "say and 
10ntrol" over the truck with regard to seNice and repairs and what sort of 
·:•·J·J~ w'Jul d not be hauled 1 n the truck. RU049 The Plaintiff had instructed 
tnc c1"1mant on st:veral occasions not to accept exempt loads (relating to 
\1Jrcl1aroJesl. RuU49 The Plaintiff could remove the truck from service if he 
'''•1oed Dr µut it anywnere he pleased, leaving the claimant with the alter-
·'t; vrcc of ace ept i ng the change or quitting. RU04~ 
1111 , id1111ant had oeen a truck driver for approximately twenty-three 
1 1, hod never owned his own truck. ROU49 He had never been an in-




IN KEVIEl<ING CERTAIN UETE~l!NATIONS OF THE !NlJUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOY~NT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL 
AFFIRM THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS UNUER AJ; INTERMEOIATl STANlJ-
ARD OF REVIEW IF SUCH ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE ANlJ PROV!OE A REASONABLE AND RATIONAL APPLICATION OF 
LAW TO FACT. 
The standard of review in employer contribution cases, as in all un-
employment insurance cases, is confined to questions of law. As stated in 
Superior Cable Installers, Inc. v. Industrial ColMlission of Utah, Utah, No. 
19407, Slip Opinion (S.Ct. Utah, April 18, 1984): 
The role of this Court in reviewing the findings of 
the Board is limited by U.C.A., 1953, §35-4-lO(i), 
which sets forth the standard of review: "In any Judi-
cial proceeding under this section, the findings of the 
camnission and the board of review as to the facts if 
supported by evidence, shall be conclusive and the jur-
isdiction of the court shall be confined to questions 
of 1 aw." 
Therefore, if the findings of the Board of Review 
are supported by the evidence, the decision must be 
af finned. 
This Court, ruling on unemployment insurance matters, has consistent!) 
held, that where the findings of fact of the Commission and the Board of Re-
view are supported by evidence they will not be disturbed. Martinez v. B_oarc 
of Review, 25 U. 2d 131, 477 P.2d 587 (1970) and Whitney v. Board of Revie• 
of Industrial ColMlission of Utah, Utah, 58~ P.2d 78U (1978J. This same 
standard has been preserved by this Court in other decisions arising fr~­
administrative actions. Milne Truck Line, Inc. v. Public Service Comm__i_s2l_lln. 
Utah, 368 P.2d 590 (1962) and PB! Freight Service v. Public Service CoTITI 11 
sion of Utah, Utah, 598 P .2d 13~2 (197'!). 
-4-
''Jtter' before the Court have, in practice, provided instances where 
··'"' ,i·1<.hotvmous standard of review is not so clearly applicable. Cases 
wt,11 h give rise to mixed questions of law and fact have generated an inter-
mediate category of review of administrative decisions upon which the courts 
r<eru se a S(Ope of review more extensive than when reviewing agency findings 
on questions of basic fact, but less extensive than when reviewing to correct 
crrnr in agency decisions on questions of general law. Salt Lake City Corp-
"'a_t._io_n v. Uepartment of Employment Security, Utah, 657 P.2d 1312 (1982). In 
reviewing the a\Jency's decisions in questions of mixed law and fact and the 
3ppl1cation of findings of fact to the legal rules governing a case, a court 
'..houlo afford great deference to the technical expertise or rrore extensive 
experience of the responsible agency so long as those decisions fall within 
trre limits of reasonableness and rationality. Gray v. Department of Employ-
m~~~-~~u_r:_i_t.r. Utah, 681 P.2d 807 (1984), City of Orem v. Christensen, Utah, 
bb2 P.cd i:'.~i:'. (19b4J, Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
~i:.l'v_~c~_(,_~n!12_~ssion, Utah, 658 P.2d 601 (1983) This latter case goes on to 
describe that category of review more fully as follows: 
Also among these intennediate issues are the Com-
m1ss1on's decisions on what can be called questions of 
"special law." These are the Commission's interpreta-
tions of the operative provisions of the statutory law 
it is empowered to administer, especially those gener-
alized tenns that bespeak a legislative intent to dele-
gate their interpretation to the responsible agency. In 
reviewing agency decisions of this type, we apply what 
we have cal led the "time honored rule of law •.• that 
the construction of statutes by gover~nental agencies 
charged with their administration should be given consid-
erable weight .... " McPhie v. Industrial ColTITiission, 
-5-
Utah, 5b7 P.Zd l5J, h5 (1977); l<le_s_t ~ordan v. DH9ai) 
m~~!_~~E~pl oym~~!_-~~r;:_i_tJt_, Utah, ITb P:ic1 41 l . 
An agency s 1nterµretat1on of key provisions of the 
statute it is empowered to administer is often insepar-
able frcxn its application of the rules of law to the 
basic facts ... 
Reasonableness must al so be determined w1 th reference to the speci fie temi 1 
of the underlying legislation and in light of the public policy sought to be 
served. Utah Department of Administrative Services, supra. The primary pub-
lic policy consideration under the Employment Security Act, as stated in ~l5-
4-L of the Act, is to protect against econCJTii c i nsecu ri ty due to unemployment 
which is a serious menace to the health, morals and welfare of the people cf 
this state. Thus it is in the public interest to protect against the crush-
ing blow of unemployment on the worker and his family. Further, a liberal 
construction of the Act in favor of the worker is required to best effectuate 
its stated purposes. Gocke v. l<liesley, 18 Utah 2d 44, 420 P.2d 44 l l9bbl; 
Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Departmen_t __ o_i 
Placement and Unemployment Insurance, 104 U. 175, 134 P.Zd 479 119431, 
Johnson v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, Department of Employment 
Security, 7 Utah 2d 113, 320 P.Zd 315 (1958). 
When the aecis1on being reviewed represents the agency's weighing of 
competing values to select a particular goal, its interpretation of a special 
law, or its application of its findings of fact to a finding or conclusioc 
on the "ultimate facts" in the case, Judicial review necessarily involves ,n 
independent Judgment of the reasonableness of the agency decision. Howeve• 
the statutory setting in which the decision operates must provide the backdr01· 
-6-
Ju<J11.1al process. Utah Department of Administrative Services and 
'""''n'j tt1ese pardlneters in mind, the Court should affinn the decision 
, f thr Aµµeal t<eferee if that decision is: 
1. found to be within the parameters defined by the Act; 
c:. supported by competent evidence (which need not be 
uncontrad1cted evidence pursuant to Salt Lake City 
Corporation, supra.); and 
J. reasonable in its application of the agency's policy 
to the facts. 
·!avin•j 1net these criteria in its review and decision-making processes, the 
8efendant asserts that the Court will affirm the Agency's findings. The 
Oef 0 ndant sets out the tests utilized in reaching its ultimate conclusions 
in the "Arguments" below which demonstrate the Agency's proper application 
Jf fa•.t to law pursuant to the express policy of that body. 
POINT JI 
Trll ~lKrUKMAi'<Cf. UF PERSUNAL SlRVICE FOk It.AGES, PUKSUANT TO THE 
ulFIN!TIUNS PROVIDED IN THE ACT, IS THE ESSENTIAL PRELIMINARY 
F!NuiNu TU FukTHLR UlNSIDlRATIUN OF THE EMPLOYEE/INDEPENDENT 
LUNTRACTOR ISSUE. 
~laint1ff's Drief has raised an issue as to whether the claimant and 
1,,. o d1 iver were in partnership, thereby precluding any consideration of 
1 1,,.,,, 111J1v1dual ly as emµloyees. Plaintiff's witness made the following claim 
Jt the aµ peal hearing: 
- 7 -
... Ed and Annette are a team, a partnership, con-
tracting with Daryl Nielsen to drive the truck for a 
speci fie mil age [sic] rate and I question the fact that 
he is an employee. R.OCJsZ 
No evidence was presented in support of this assertion. Payments were mact 
to each party individually. R.0044 Expense records gave the full nafl'<: 0 
each driver rather than any partnership name or designation. R.CJllO Corres 
pondence was addressed to the claimant alone from the Plaintiff on Octo· 
ber 19, 191:l2. R.CJU97 The evidence which was presented in this matter point. 
solely to individual employment; therefore, consideration of question or 
personal seNice for wages pursuant to the Act is required. 
Perfonnance of personal service for wages is predicated on the statuto•: 
langua~e of ~~3~-4-LZ(J)(l) and 3~-4-Zdp) of the Act. ~J~-4-Zl(J)(l) l';Jlc 
that: 
"lmployment" means any seNice ... perfonned for wages 
or under any contract of hire written or oral, express or 
implied. 
~35-4-ZZ(p) defines "wages" as: 
.. all renumeration for personal services including 
commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all re-
numeration in any medium other than cash. Gratuities 
customarily received by an individual in the course of 
his employment fr()l1 persons other than his employing unit 
shall be treated as wages received from his employing 
unit. The reasonable cash value of renumeration in any 
medium other than cash and the reasonable amount of gra-
tuities shall be estimated and deten11i ned in accordance 
with the rules prescribed by the commission ... 
Those relationships which are excluded from the definitional test fo1 ""'1' 
ment must be bona fide lessor-lessee, vendor-vendee or franchise re1dl'' 
ships as established historically by a long line of cases resolved bef.:• 
-8-
1,, lourc. F_ul_l_~r____B~u~ v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 9'1 U. 97, 104 
co cul (194U); Singer Sewing Machine, supra; Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co. v. 
IL~ustrid_I_ L_O~Jljnl_s_s_i_o_r:, 9~ U. 25~. lUI'.'. P.2d 3U7 (1940); Logan-Cache Knitting 
r,ilis v. l_~d_u_strial Corrunission, 99 U. l, 1U2 P.2d 495 (1940); Blamires v. 
~l•ar-d of _R_e_v_i~"'__O_f __ _D_e~tment of Employment Security of Industrial Commis-
s;on, iHah, 5!:l4 P.2d 889 (1978); Leach v. Board of Review of Industrial Com-
m1_ss1_on, D_epartment of Employment Security, 123 U. 4l3, 260 P.2d 744 (1953). 
il1e inoiv1dual who gains his income from services performed as an auto mech-
anic, dentist, plurroer, CPA or even as a truck driver, is brought within the 
test of ~:i:i-4-22(J)(l) as rendering personal services for renumeration. The 
broad application of this test is seen in the language of Fuller Brush, ~upra, 
winch says in part: 
A takes to the blacksmith a horse to be shod and a plow 
point to be sharpened. The smith renders personal ser-
vice and receives renumeration for his time and labor, 
which constitutes wages under the act. 
in our case the claimant drove a truck owned by the Plaintiff, and at the re-
quest of the Plaintiff, for pay. The evidence being sufficient for a finding 
r,f Elnploy1,1ent under the definitions of §~35-4-22(J)(l) and 22(p), the first 
µhase ot the statutory scheme was completed by the trier of fact. Defendant 
•sserts that this finding is without error. Only after this finding is made, 
r,1n t 11~ t ,-1 er of fact proceed through the statutory framework to the three-
,,,- tf'st provided in ~~3:i-4-22(j)(~)(A),(!l) and (C) to detennine if any of 
t,,,. exclusions given there would have proper application to these findings 
dna the r.crnain1ng evidence. 
-'I-
POI NT I I I 
EACH OF THE THREE CONOITIONS SET FORTH IN §§35-4-22(j)(5)(A), 
(B) ANU (C) OF THE ACT, COMMONLY KNOl<IN AS THE "A~C TE~T," FUR 
ESTABLISHING INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS MUST BE t>'ET OR THE 
SERVICES PERFORMED WILL BE HELD TO BE EMPLOYMENT. 
§35-4-2Z(j)(5) provides as follows: 
Services perfonned by an individual for wages or under 
any contract of hi re, written or oral, express or im-
plied, ana are deemed to be employment subject to this 
act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of 
the comrni ssion that: 
(A) The indivioual has been and will continue to be free 
from control and direction over the perfor1nance of those 
services, both under his contract of hi re and in fact; 
(ll) The service is either outside the usual course of 
the business for which tt1e service is perfonned or that 
the service is perfonmed outside of all of the places of 
business of the enterprise for which the service is per-
formed; and 
(C) The individual is customarily engaged in an indepen-
dently established trade, occupation, profession, or busi-
ness of the same nature as that involved in the contract 
of service. 
The exclusion provisions are in the conjunctive. Therefore, all thm 
elernents of the ABC Test must be met in order for services to be exclude' 
from coverage as employment under the Act. Superior Cable Installers an,; 
Leach, supra. Failure to meet the reguirements of any one is sufficient t: 
support a finding that the services provided constitute employment. GloD: 
Grain and Milling Co. v. Industrial Corrvnission, 98 U. 36, 91 P.Zd Sil il9Y' 
Some pertinent characteristics of the Plaintiff's relationship w1tn 1 
claimant in the case at hand are: 
-lu-
11 The claimant was hired to drive the truck by the Plain-
tiff. 
2 i The Plaintiff retained the sole right to discontinue the 
claimant's services. 
o) The claimant received load and destination infonnation 
from the contract carrier, F.B. Truck Line. 
41 ~ome loaas offered by the contract carrier were not pro-
fitable due to surcharge problems. 
ol The Plaintiff retained the right to detennine what loads 
would or would not be hauled by the claimant. 
o) The Plaintiff exercised his discretion in refusing cer-
tain loads on several occasions. 
7) Tne Plaintiff approved maJor repairs on the truck prior 
to any work being performed and bore the costs of the 
repairs. 
bl The Plaintiff paid the claimant at a flat rate of pay 
($.lb per mile when first hired and later $.20 per mile). 
9) The claimant had no stake in the profits of the trucking 
enterprise. 
lu) The claimant was paid directly by the Plaintiff when 
advances made by the contract carrier to the claimant did 
not cover the full amount due pursuant to No. 8 above. 
In Rev. Rul. 524, 1971-72 C.B. 346 advice was requested as to whether a 
truck driver is an employee of the party leasing a tractor-trailer rig with 
a d1·1ver to a contract carrier when the right to direct and control the 
driver to the extent necessary to protect the investment is retained by the 
lessor. The following conclusions were drawn: 
In the instant case the leasing c001pany owns the 
tractor-trailer rigs and leases them with driver; it 
furnishes major repairs, tires, ana license plates for 
the rigs; it generates all the work or jobs; it bears 
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the major expenses and financial risks of the business; 
and it hires the driver to perfonn personal services on 
a continuing basis. The driver is not engaged in an 
independent enterprise requiring capital outlays or the 
assumption of business risks, but rather his services 
are a necessary and integral part of the leasing compa-
ny's business. The leasing company has the right to 
direct and control the driver to the extent necessary to 
protect its investment, and to discharge him if his con-
duct jeopardizes its contract with the carrier. 
Accordingly, it is held that the driver engaged in 
perfonni ng services under the circumstances described 
above is an employee of the leasing company for the pur-
poses of the Federal Contributions Act, the Federal Un-
emµl oyment Tax Act, and the Collection of Income Tax at 
Source on Wages. 
There are several pertinent excerpts from the testimony in the case at ha110 
which it is now appropriate to review. The first of these demonstrates the 
nature of the claimant's working relationship with the Plaintiff as lon; 
term and precluding the possibility of other work during the same period b:1 
its full-time nature: 
Referee: .. ..tien did you first start working for 
Nielsen Enterprises? 
Claimant: Ah, June 20, officially June 29, 1981. 
Referee: Okay, and then the last day of employment we 
have October 4, 191:Ji:'., are we correct? 
Claimant: That is correct? [sicj 
Referee: What type of work were you doing? 
Claimant: I was driving. 
Referee: And your rate of pay? 
Claimant: In 198I it was 16 cents a mile, in 1982 it was 
20 cents a mile. 
-IL-
Referee: All right, and you were a full-time employee? 
Claimant: Yes, m'am. R.0027 
1n,_ cla1111ant l1as a long history of work of this nature: 
Referee: ..• Now have you ever been a truck owner or 
ever done this on your own? 
Claimant: No m'am. 
Referee: Okay. Have you al ways driven for someone else? 
Clai1nant: Yes m' am. 
Referee: How long have you been driving? 
Claiamnt: Oh, approximately 23 years. R.0048 
It was the claimant's understanding that he had been "hired" by the Plaintiff 
and that the Plaintiff alone had the authority to tenninate his services: 
Referee: ••• If F. and B. [contract carrier] had been 
displeased with you as a driver, would they 
have been able to tenninate your relationship? 
Claimant: They would have notified the owner of the 
tractor that they wanted me tenni natea, is 
what they would have done. 
Referee: Ana then the tenni nation would have been done 
by whom? 
Claimant: By the person who hired me, Mr. Nielsen 
[Plaintiff]. R.0047 
1'la;11t1ft's accountant concurred in this authority: 
Referee: Who would have the right to fire either 
Berle [sic] Lclaimant] or Si11UTis? 
Plaintiff's Accountant: Well Daryl [Plaintiff] would be 
the only one that would have had any right to 
do that as far as I know. R.0044 
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With regara to control over the actual work perfonned the follow 1 fl'J 1 
significant: 
Referee: ... Then ah, who gave the directions of 
where you were to go and what you were sup-
posed to do in tenns of loads? 
Claimant: Ah, dispatching and loading orders came from 
F.B. TrucKlines Lsic] Lcontract carrier]. 
Referee: Okay, did Mr. Nielsen [Plaintiff] have any-
thing to do with that at all? 
Claimant: Not as far as dispatching and such. Now he 
could, at his discretion, tell us certain 
loads that he would not want us to take .. 
R.UU48 
Plaintiff's Accountant: Ed [claimant], at any time did 
Daryl [Plaintiff] request you not to take a 
load? 
Claimant: Yes he did Orin, ah, several times he asked 
me not to take exempt loads. R.0049 
Not only did the Plaintiff have the right to control which jobs the claimant 
might perfonn, but this right was exercised on several occasions. 
Monies due the claimant for his work were covered in part by advance1 
made by F .B. Truck Lines, but any balance due was paid by the Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Accountant: Wel 1 he [Plaintiff] put the 
money in the bank account and paid the bills 
out of it like the truck payments, the insur-
ance and then occasionally he'd pay Ed [claim-
antJ or Simm some amount that they claimed 
they had coming. R.UU44 
Referee: And how were your checks made out? 
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Claimant: The checks, ..tien I received them I was usually 
going through Salt Lake City and they would be 
made out to me and I would usually cash then 
right on the spot. 
Referee: What was the name of the company on the check? 
Claimant: Ah, it is run from, as I stated, from Daryl 
Nielsen's [Plaintiff's) personal account to 
Daryl Neilsen truck account, ah, Nielsen 
Enterprises, ah, let's see, DN land develop-
ment in Ogden, Utah. And I have been paid in 
cash at times. R.0027 and 0028 
P.epai rs to be made on the truck were handled as follows: 
Claimant: ... If the truck needed repairs I could not 
authorize the 11YJneys [sic) to pay for any re-
pairs. That had to come fr~TI either Mr. Alex-
ander [Plaintiff's accountant) or Mr. Neilsen 
[Plaintiff]. F.B., while they were in essence 
handling the running of the truck, it was at 
the owners [sic] discretion at any time he 
wished to he could remove the truck from 
F.B. 's service, he could put the truck any-
where he wanted to put the truck. My option 
was 1 could either go where he put the tractor 
or 1 could quit and get off the tractor and go 
look for work elsewhere. R.OU4'i 
Considering the characteristics observed in this employment situation and en-
urnerJted on page 11 of this point plus the testimony reviewed above, an almost 
identical case to that in Rev. Rul. 524, supra, is presented by the case at 
hand. 
Other similar fact situations have given rise to case law on point here. 
In H~rry_J:_._Young and Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, Utah, 538 P.2d 316 (1975), this 
Court u1stinguished the enployer/employee relationship from that of an inde-
re'ldent contractor in holding that the employee is hired, paid a fixed salary 
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or rate and is subJ ect to a greater degree of control in the perfo nnance of 
his duties than is the independent contractor who is engaged to do 10," 
particular project or piece of work, usually for a set sum and is respon11 o1e 
only for satisfactory completion of the task. The Court went on to point out 
that the furnishing of equipment, particularly expensive equipment, has, 
significant bearing upon the issue of retention of control by the employer. 
This language has brought us precisely to the "control and direction" 
elaborated in the "A Test" of §35-4-22(j)(5). Comparing the Court's findi~s 
to the present factual scenario, it is apparent that the relationship between 
the Plaintiff and the claimant is one of employment as affinnatively assertEd 
by hiring, firing and pay practices and in tenns of investment. This findrnq 
is further supported by this Court's decision in Kinne v. Industrial Cofllllis· 
~ion, Utah, bU9 P .~d 92b ( l9t!CJ) where the truck driver was al so found to be 
the employee of the truck owner-lessor. 
As a further consideration under the "A Test", it has been noted that: 
The most important factor to be considered in detennin-
ing whether an arrangement between a principal and 
another person for the perfonnance of work creates an 
employer-employee relationship between them is whether 
the principal has the right to control the manner in 
which the other µerson perfonns the work in question. 
Mori sh v. United States, 5~5 F.2d 794 (Ct. Cl. 1977). 
In the above case the fact that the plaintiff exercised his right of co~trc: 
in a broaa sense by only generally ironitoring the activities of his true· 
drivers did not militate against the existence of the right of contro·1, Pd' 
ticularly as the nature of the work involved did not require, or even pennit 
-lb-
,,, 1 much actual supervision by the plaintiff. Again precedent case law has 
1csolved a comparable fact situation in favor of an employer/employee rela-
tionship. 
The "~ fest" sets forth a perplexing alternative situation whereby either 
of tt10 elements would result in a finding favorable to independent contractor 
staws. To reiterate the statute, the individual is held to be an indepen-
Jent contractor if the service provided is outside the usual course of busi-
ness or it the service is perfonned outside all of the places of business of 
the enterprise for which the service is perfonned. A truck is a mobile 
working environment, thereby increasing the complexity of applying this 
test. In ~lamir~, supra, the "B Test" was satisfied because Blamires per-
fonned his services outside any places of business which his principal had 
previously maintained or which were utilized for any purpose except Blamires' 
As distinguished fran Blamires, this claimant perfonned his services 
within the physical facility, the truck itself, provided by the Plaintiff. 
Jt1l1zation of the facility served both the Plaintiff and the claimant in 
Lenns of financial gains. At the end of the claimant's services, the fa-
,1lity remained in the hands of the Plaintiff, as further evidence of em-
µlJyment pursuant here to the "B Test". 
1 .. n 111.j1vidual who is customarily engaged in an independently estab-
11cl1eu trade, profession, occupation or business meets the criteria for ex-
, lus1on as an iooeperldent contractor under the "C Test" of §35-4-22(J)(5). 
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The statute is interpreted to mean neither "independently engaged in, 
established business" nor "customarily engaged in an independent busine 11 . 
Fuller Brush Co., supra. As correctly interpreted in Fuller Brush: 
The adverb "independently" clearly modi fies the word 
"established", and must therefore carry the meaning 
that the "business" or "trade" was established indepen-
dently of the employer or the rendering of personal 
service fonTiing the basis of the claim. 
As in Superior Cablevision, supra., this claimant did not work for anyone 
other than the Plaintiff. The claimant had no ownership or proprieta~ i~ 
terest in the Plaintiff's trucking venture that he could have transferreG 
to another for value. 
The good wil 1, if any, attaching to this venture inured to the benefit 
of the Plaintiff rather than the claimant. The claimant was but a replace-
able part of the business venture. As held in Leach, supra, and particular!, 
applicable to the present claimant, the clairnants: 
... had nothing aside from their relationship with the 
plaintiffs. When the services of a dealer were termin-
ated by the plaintiffs, he became unemployed and had to 
secure employment elsewhere. He had no business of his 
own to fall back on--a business established independently 
of his relationship with the plaintiffs and from which 
his services for the plaintiffs emanated, a business in 
which he was customarily engaged aside from his relation-
ship with the plaintiffs. 
If the truck were removed from the claimant's use, he would have been ler: 
without tools or equipment to perform his trade, other than his basic driv · 
skill which certainly alone cannot be construed to com)Jrise an independen' 1 • 
established business. Even ownership of the truck by the worker 1° n1' 
-HJ-
,,,,,essar1ly indicative of an independent contractor relationship rather than 
,,, ""µlayer/employee relationship. See Showers v. Lund, Neb. 242 N.W.258 
1JYJil, North_Alabama Motor Exp. v. Whiteside, Ala., 169 So. 335 (1936); 
lex_as_Em_)l_loyer's Ins. Asso. v. Owen, Tex., 298 S.W.542 (1927) and Annot., 120 
A.L k. lUJl, 1U52 et. seq. The evidence here does not show the claimant to 
r1ave haa an independently established business to rely on when separated from 
the Pl a inti ff. 
Having exhausted each test, not merely one of the three as required by 
precedent, and upon finding in each case sufficient evidence to support a 
,_onclus1on of employment, the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff was in 
fact the employer of the claimant for the proper application of unemployment 
111suronce law. 
CONCLUSION 
A thorough analysis of the facts presented and statutes applicable to 
this case has been made at each level of review by the Commission pursuant 
to historically established principles handed down by this Court. The 
Appt<ll Referee and the Board of Review ruled without error in the findings, 
supported by suostanti al and competent evidence, that the Plaintiff employed 
the claimant and that such employment was not suoject to exclusion from the 
c 1vPru 1ic of the AeC Test set forth in ~35-4-22(J)(5) of the Act. The deci-
1u11 ot the Lom1111ssion, that the Plaintiff is liable for contributions to the 
unemploy111ent insurance fund on behalf of the claimant, should be affirmed 
uy this Lou rt. 
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Respectfully submitted this 5th day of September, 1Yb4. 
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